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The conclusion I came to during my time in the Foreign
Office was that the old international order was neither a
natural phenomenon to which humanity had simply
adjusted its behaviour nor a fortuitous aggregation of
countless past events of human interaction. The old
international order determines the possibilities perceived
by, and hence available to, politicians and governments
and, so far as they play any part in the system, members of
the general public. But the international system itself is
*
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nothing other than a structure of ideas; and it has been

made nowhere else than in the human mind.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In her seminal article, Burley2 challenged international lawyers to
explore the implications of recent political science theory upon
international law theory. This essay is an attempt to take up that
challenge. I shall use the bureaucratic politics model of the state3 and of
the organizational decision making process,' and the concepts of
international regimes,, transgovernmental networks 6 and epistemic

communities7 to propose an explanation about how and why international
law is created, applied and maintained.

1. PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA, NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD xv-xvi (1990).
2. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory:
A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 239 (1993).
Overall, international lawyers can ill afford to ignore the growing wealth of political
science data on the world they seek to regulate. The measurements may be imprecise,
the theories crude, but the whole offers at least the hope of a positive science of world
affairs. As an adolescent discipline, international political science long rejected the
insights of international law. As it grows, it rediscovers what international lawyers
never forgot, but with added insights of its own. In the end, law informed by politics is
the best guarantee of politics informed by law.
See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 717-731 (1995) (summarizing the main
schools of thought in International Relations Theory).
3.
See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS (1971) for a complete, and now classical, exposition of the model of bureaucratic
politics decision making; but see Edward Rhodes, Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some
Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the US Navy, 47 WORLD POL. 1 (1994); Stephen D.
Krasner, Are BureaucraciesImportant?(orAllison Wonderland), 7 FOREIGN POL'Y 159 (1972).
4. See generally PAUL R. KLEINDORFER ET AL., DECISION SCIENCES, AN INTEGRATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 295-303 (1993).
5. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) [hereinafter REGIME
THEORY].
6. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE (2nd ed. 1989); THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS].

7. See generally Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of
International Environmental Co-Operation, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 168
[hereinafter Haas, Epistemic Communities]; Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1-35 (1992) [hereinafter
Haas, Introduction].
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I shall question the state as a unitary actor paradigm, dominant in
international law theory, and argue that it is possible to explain
international law while conceptualizing the state as bureaucratic entity. I
shall suggest that, if states are thus to conceptualize, it is possible to
explain international law not as a creation of states but of individuals; that
international law is an international regime created and maintained by the
epistemic community of international law practitioners. In simpler words,
that international law is a set "of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations"' created and applied by
a community of international lawyers and practitioners through their
participation in their state's or organization's bureaucratic processes of
foreign policy making, and that, in consequence, it reflects the share
conceptions of those individuals. 9

II.

THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

A. State as a Unitary The Actor Model
Public international law appears to be a state centered system. It
assumes states are its main subjects and creators. Only states can be
members of the United Nations'0 and only states can be parties in cases
before the International Court of Justice." States conclude treaties 2 and
their general practice constitutes customary international law. 3 Even the
principles of international law are postulated in terms of states' rights and
obligations:

8. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in ROBERT J.
BECK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RULES 167 (1996).
9. A preliminary exposition of some these theses was attempted in Carlos Fernando DiazPaniagua, InternationalLaw and the Decision Making Process: Some Observations on Tacsan's
Alternative Approach, 11(1) INT'L LEGAL THEORY 17 (1996) (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law Interest
Group on the Theory of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.).
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para 1 ("Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.").
11. I.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1 ("Only States may be parties in cases before the
Court.").
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 6, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 ("Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.").
13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed.

1990).
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[e]very State has the duty to refrain in its international
relations from the threat or use of force . . .Every State
shall settle its international disputes with other States by
peaceful means . . .No State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State.1
This state-centered conception of international law corresponds to
the traditional theories of international relations that purport to explain
international relations, including international law, as the result of state
action. These theories assume that states are unitary rational actors, i.e.,
unitary decision making entities, with only one set of goals, perceived
options and estimated consequences of those options; that choose among
their options that whose expected consequences they rank highest in terms
of their goals."
This approach is illustrated by the neo-realist theory of K. Waltz
which contends that:
[s]tates are the units whose interactions form the structure
of international political systems. . . . To say that a state
is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope
with its internal and external problems, including whether
or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to
limit its freedom by making commitments to them. States
develop their own strategies, chart their own course, make
their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs
their experience and whatever desires they develop.16
B. Limitations and Alternatives to the 'State as a Unitary Actor'
Model
The realities of international relations, that constitute the object of
both international law and international relations theory, are more complex
than their representation by the state as a rationaland unitary actor model.
States are neither unitary nor rational entities but fictious persons.
Individuals interacting constitute states' substance. As Judge Cassese
14. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th sess., U.N. Doc A1RES/2625 (1970).

15. See generally ALLISON, supra note 3, at 10-38 (providing a general exposition of the
State as a rational actor model).
16. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 95-96 (1979).
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wrote: "States have no soul, no capacity to form and express an
autonomous will; they are 'abstract' structures acting through individuals.
Human beings alone can give flesh and blood to State activity." "7
This condition in the nature of states necessarily affects the
operation international law. Treaties are, in fact, negotiated, signed,
ratified and deposited by individuals acting on behalf of their states. State
practice, that generates customary law, is really the sum of acts performed
individual human beings. Particular norms of international law are, in the
same way, complied with or violated, not by metaphysical entities, but by
individuals.'" These phenomena are unavoidable and, in consequence,
several substantive norms of international law respond to them. For
example, both the rules regarding representation and full powers for the
negotiation of treaties 9 and the norms sanctioning genocide2s acknowledge,
17. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 14 (1986).
18. See id. at 9-10.
Although the protagonists of international life are corporate structures, of course they
cannot but operate through individuals, who do not act on their own account but as
State officials, or rather as the tools of the structures to which they belong. Thus, for
instance, if a treaty of extradition is concluded by the UK with the USSR, this deal
should not blind us to what actually happens, namely that the international instrument
is concretely brought into being by individuals and is subsequently implemented by
individuals. Diplomats belonging to the two states negotiate the agreement; the
instrument of ratification is formally approved and signed by the Heads of State, if
necessary after authorization by parliamentary assemblies. Once a treaty has entered
into force, it is implemented by the courts of each country and, if required, also by
officials of the respective Ministries of Justice and, indeed, it is generally for the
courts to grant or refuse in each particular case.
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 7, 47, 50, 51, 1155
U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
(Art. 7.1. A person is considered as representing a state for the purpose of adopting or
authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the state to be
bound by a treaty if:
he produces appropriate full powers; or
it appears from the practice of the state concerned or from other circumstances that their
intention was to consider that person as representing the state for such purposes and to dispense
with full powers.
2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are
considered as representing their state:
a) heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs, for the purpose
of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty;
b) heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between
the accrediting state and the state to which they are accredited;
Representatives accredited by states to an international conference or to an international
organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that
conference, organization or organ.
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and purport to regulate, the role of individuals acting on behalf of their
states.
Similarly, international relations theory and political science have
acknowledged the limitations of the state as a rational actor model for
describing the complex realities of international politics and have proposed
several alternative conceptions of the state .21 One of these is the statist
conception of the state, according to which states are "central decisionmaking organizations and personnel"2 interacting both with domestic and
transnational actors and with other states.
This kind of conception of the state has been called subsystemic,
second image2 and a two level approach because it uses the states' internal
organization and politics for explaining their foreign policy and, more
broadly, the whole international society. Even if in international relations

theory and political science there still are considerable discrepancies about
which elements should be emphasized and about the basic terminology,n

there is a growing consensus that:
Art. 47. If the authority of a representative to express the consent of a state to be bound by
a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to observe that
restriction may not be invoked as invalidating the consent expressed by him unless the restriction
was notified to the other negotiating states prior to his expressing such consent.
Art. 50. If the expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured
through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating state, the
state may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty
Art. 51. The expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured by
the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any
legal effect.
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res.
260, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260a (1948). 1021 U.N.T.S. 277 ("Art. 4. Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.").
21.

See generally MARTIN HOLLIS & STEVE SMITH, EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 32-36 (1990) (summarizing the recent theoretical developments in
political science regarding the State).
22. Stephen D. Krasner, Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Telations, in
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at 259.
23. Michael Zurn, Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About Domestic Sources of
Regime and the Course of Debt Crisis of the 1980s, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 28292.
24. HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 7-9; Andrew Kydd & Duncan Snidal, Progress in GameTheoretical Analysis of InternationalRegimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY, supra
note 5, at 127-34.
25. See generally HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 38-41; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing
TransnationalRelations Back in: Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at
17-28 (discussing the current debates about the role of the state and of its domestic structures in
international politics).
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the way in which states bargain and co-operate cannot be
understood except with reference to the changing nature of
the state and the domestic political system. States interests
are not fixed but vary accordingly to the institutional
context, to the degree of organization of the contending
political forces within the state and wider political system,
and to the leadership capacities of the major actors?'

Il.

THE BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF THE STATE AND THE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS
A classic form of the statist alternative to the state as a rational
actor model is the governmental or bureaucratic politics model.27 This
model purports to explain the conduct and policy, of states, but also of any
other bureaucratic entity; either a corporation, an international
organization, a non-governmental organization, or an interest group, as the
outcome of interaction between human beings. 2

A. Bureaucrats,interests and influence
The key assumption of the bureaucraticpolitics model is that states
and organizations are not unitary decision making actors but sets of
bureaucrats bargaining between themselves. 2 ' States do not have a unitary
set of goals, options and estimated consequences of those options, but
rather each individual actor in the internal decision-making process has its
own goals, conceptions and interests that he tries to promote, with the
power at his disposal, within and through the organization."° Therefore, its
main contention is that the actions attributed to the state are not rationally
chosen solutions to particular problems but rather the result from
"compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence."

26. Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes, a Reflective
Approach, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 69, reprinted in BECK, supra note 8, at 206.
27.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 144-244; see also HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 146-54;

KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 288-303.
28. See KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 288-303.
29. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 164 ("The governmental actor is neither a unitary agent
nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players. Groups of
these players constitute the agent for particular governmental decisions and actions. Players are
men in jobs."). Id.; HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 146-47; KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 296.
30. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 166-67; KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 296.
31. ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162.
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This model assumes that each individual actor in the internal

decision making process has and promotes his own goals, conceptions and
interests. 32 These private goals and interests flow, in part, from the
position of each actor in the bureaucratic organization but also from his
personal values, interests and conception of his role." Even more, these

actors can sponsor certain outcomes due to misrepresentation of the
situation or the options, 3' lack or inaccurate communication with other
actors, reticence to take certain risks, self-imposed constraints" and even
3

erroneous expectations . 6

In addition, the bureaucratic politics model assumes that the

individual actors in the decision making process have diverse power. Each
actor's capacity to influence the final governmental action, his power,
depends on his possession of bargaining advantages, on his skill and will to
use his advantages, and on the other actor's perception of his possession
and willingness to use those advantages. Bargaining advantages are those
elements, including 'formal authority, position, responsibilities, expertise,
control of information and resources, charisma, and personal relations with
other actors which also have bargaining advantages, that enable each actor
37
to influence the final outcome.
Furthermore, this model does not distinguish, in principle, between
policy or strategic decision making and regular conduct or routine
32. See id. at 166-67; KLEINDORFER , supra note 4, at 296.
33. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 166-7.

A Secretary of State's resolution . . . depends not only upon the position, but also
upon the player who occupies it. For players are also people; men's metabolisms
differ. The hard core of bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man
manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the
complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circles are
irreductible pieces of the policy blend. Then, too, each person comes to his position
with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to
various projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in the society.
See generally KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 35-42; YAACOV Y. I. VERZTBERGER, THE
WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION AND PERCEPTION IN

FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING 113 (1990) (providing a detailed discussion of the role of
personal beliefs in the decision making process: "[t]he most elementary cognitive tools with
which the decisionmaker approaches, and attempts to clarify and impose meaning, on complex
and uncertain environments are beliefs, values and stereotypes. They serve as guides to
information processing and become a baseline for interpretations, expectation and predictions of
others' behavior."). But see HOLLIS, supra note 21, at 151 n.10 (arguing that the actors'
preferences are determined only by their positions Within the bureaucratic structure).
34. See KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 52-56.

35. See id. at 56-58.
36.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178-79.

37. See id. at 168-69.
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decisions. 3 Any conduct requires to be performed, the decision of an
individual to execute it. Nonetheless, this model acknowledges that most
decisions are interrelated. First, because, as far as general policy decisions
usually require long series of subordinate decisions for their
implementation, there are a series of concatenated decisions. Second,
previous decisions may determine the issues and options being considered
and the power, interests and commitments of the actors. It further
recognizes that the actors that make those subordinate decisions also try to
promote their own goals, and that, in consequence, they try to modify,
ignore or construe the previous decisions, with the power at their disposal,
in order to favor their desired outcomes.3 9 In this sense, an actor entrusted
with the implementation of a policy decision can be more influential upon
the final outcome than the actor who took it.40
The consequence of these assumptions is that any state's or
bureaucratic entity's action is an agglutination of several relatively
independent judgments.41 The final outcome of the decision making
process is the result of the bargaining among several actors each of which
"pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for the outcomes that will
advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal
interests. "42 Thus, the final action cannot be the result of a rational
selection between several options considering their estimated consequences
against the entities' goals, nor of a simple choice by a unitary group, nor
even the result of a coordinated policy or a common intention
independently pursued. On the contrary, it is rather the sum of the inputs
of several actors that were able either to act independently or to prevail i
the decision making process at its different levels.
Additionally, this model recognizes that individuals outside of the
formal structure of the bureaucratic entity also take part in the decision
38. See id. at 169-70 (discussing the channels of action). But see KLEINDORFER, supra
note 4, at 298-99 (distinguishing between strategic, tactical and routine decisions).
39.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 173.

Most decisions leave considerable leeway in implementation. Players who supported
the decision will maneuver to see it implemented and may go beyond the spirit if not
the letter of the decision. Those who opposed the decision, or opposed the action, will
maneuver to delay implementation, to limit implementation to the letter but not to the
spirit, and even to have the decision disobeyed.
40. See id. at 175 ("The mix of players and each player's advantages shift not only
between action-channels but also along action-channels. Chiefs dominate the major formal
decisions on important foreign policy issues, but indians, especially those in the organization
charged with carrying out the decision, may play a major role thereafter."); KLEINDORFER,
supra note 4, at 301.
41.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 171-73.

42.

Id. at 171.
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making process. In the case of states, while this model acknowledges the
central role of governmental officials in their government's decision
making process, it recognizes that members of the parliament, press,
interest groups and the public can and do take part in it, affecting thus the
final outcome. Therefore, it suggests that there are concentric circles of
3
influence and power in which state's actions crystallize.'
B. Coalitions,Networks and Communities
The bureaucratic politics model also contends that individual
actors tend to form coalitions with other actors in order to increase their
capadity to influence the final outcome of the decision making process
through the coordinated use of their bargaining advantages.
These
coalitions are formed either with actors that share similar values or goals
before the bargaining on the specific issue starts or with actors that are
persuaded, during the bargaining process, to sponsor their proposals."
Within governments, the formation of coalitions is not limited to
each state's internal political system. When actions in one state result in
advantages or disadvantages for actors in other state's internal political
processes, or when the proposed action requires a certain degree of
international negotiation, as most acts relevant to international law do,
coalitions are formed transnationally. Furthermore, in those cases, the
actors in one state, in order to increase their own influence in the final
outcome, try to empower their allies in other states by creating bargaining
advantages for them.'4

43. See id. at 164-65. C. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of
InternationalLaw, in 86 A.S.I.L. PROC. 118-125 (1992). Taking a similar approach:
[tihe participants in any decision process include those formally endowed with decision
competence, for example judge, and all those other actors who, though not endowed
with formal competence, may nonetheless play important roles in influencing
decisions. In international decision, the observer must examine, in addition to formal
international organizations, state officials, non-governmental organizations, pressure
groups, interest groups, gangs, and individuals who act on behalf of all other
participants and on their own.
44. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 169 (referring to "personal persuasiveness with other
players (drawn from personal relations, charisma); and access and persuasiveness who have
bargaining advantages drawn from above (based on interpersonal relations, etc.)" as sources of
power.); KLEINDORFER, supra note 4, at 301. ("The political model especially highlights that in
addition to their formal positions people are part of informal networks and coalitions, and that
organizational rationality may not always prevail because of hidden agendas. This realization is
especially crucial in understanding decision making in government or other large
bureaucracies.").
45.

See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178.
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Several political scientists and international relations theorists have
devoted themselves to the study of this kind of transnational alliance." For
instance, Keohane and Nye have referred to transgovernmental coalitions
and transgovernmental policy networks as the coalitions formed by
"governmental bureaucracies charged with similar tasks . . . on particular
policy questions," 7 seeking to improve their chances of success by
bringing "actors from other governments into their own decision-making
processes as allies." 48 They have also acknowledged the relevance of
coalitions whose members do not belong to the formal governmental
structure.4 9 Thus, they use the broader concept of 'transnational relations'
to refer to all "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries
that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of
governments"" while they restrict the use of the term transnational
interactions only to describe those transnational relations in which "at least
one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental
organization. ""1
Some of these transnational coalitions are ad hoc alliances created
specifically to promote particular policies, while others are permanent
coalitions formed because its members share common values, interests and
knowledge.: Among the latter, the coalitions based on certain knowledge
have deserved a closer examination because their characteristic bargaining
advantage, their share knowledge, increases its potential influence in the
final outcome as the issues object of the decision making process grow in
complexity."
In situations of high technical intricacy or uncertainty, most of the
regular participants in the decision making process lack the necessary
knowledge to determine the key issues and, in consequence, depend on
scientific or technical expertise. In such conditions, the task of making the
46. See generally Risse-Kappen, supra note 6, at 3-13 (summarizing the recent theoretical
developments regarding transnational alliances); Haas, Introduction, supra note 7, at 16-25
(analyzing the differences between the several theoretical constructions regarding transnational
alliances).
47. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 34.
48. Id.

49. See id. at 24-25, 33-34; Joseph S. Nye & Robert 0. Keohane, TransnationalRelations
and World Politics: An Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS ix

(Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1981).
50. Nye, supra note 49, at xi. See also Risse-Kappen, supra note 6, at 3.
51. Nye, supra note 49, at xii.
52. See Haas, Introduction, supra note 7, at 16-20 (discussing the various kinds of
transnational alliances).
53. See id. at 4-16; Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179-80.
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Hence, the experts

become participants in the bureaucratic bargaining. Even more, if those
experts have political objectives, they can consolidate their influence upon
the final outcome through the acquisition of bureaucratic positions from
which they can dominate the decision making process. They can also
extend their influence through the creation of coalitions, which enable them

both to influence other actors and to avoid disagreements that might create
lack of confidence in their expertise."'
Several empirical studies have found transnational coalitions acting

in this way. In the area of international economic relations, for instance,
they have been found participating in the development of the European
Economic and Monetary Union 5 and in the trade relations between the
United States and Japan.5' They have also been found acting in the areas of
arms control,5' 7 environmental protection, from that of the African
elephantsm to that of the Mediterranean,' 9 and in Law of the Sea
negotiations,60 as described by Keohane:
[a]s transnational economic activity increased, so did
transnational political activity and contacts. . .
Oil
companies worked through their lawyers' membership in
the International Law Association, which influenced the
54. See Diana Crane, Transnational Networks in Basic Sciences, in TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 49, at 242-251; Haas, Epistemic Communities,
supra note 7, at 179.
Under conditions of complex interdependence and generalized uncertainty specialists
play a significant role in attenuating such uncertainty for decision-makers.... Under
such circumstances perceptions may be false, leaders lack adequate information for
informed choice, and traditional search procedures are impossible, information is at a
premium, and leaders look for those able to provide authoritative advice and/or
delegate responsibility to them .... Such experts' influence is subject to their ability
to avoid widespread internal disagreement, and their influence persists through their
ability to consolidate political power through capturing important bureaucratic
positions in national administrations, from which they may persuade other decisionmakers or usurp control over decision-making.
55. See David R. Cameron, Transnational Relations and the Development of European
Economic and Monetary Union, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 37.
56. See Peter J. Katzenstein & Yutaka Tsujinaka, "Bullying, "Buying," and "Binding":
US-Japanese TransnationalRelations and Domestic Structures, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
supra note 6, at 79.
57. See Matthew Evangelista, TransnationalRelations, Domestic Structures, and Security
Policy in the USSR and Russia, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 146.
58. See Thomas Princen, Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational
Coalitions, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS supra note 6, at 227.
59. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 191-201.
60. See KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 86-162.
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International Law Commission's work on draft conventions
for
the
1958
conference.
Scientists organized
transnationally in the Scientific Committee on Oceans
Research (SCOR) and successfully pressed their
governments to create the International Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) to coordinate large-scale oceanographic
research. World order groups worked transnationally to
promote a stronger international regime.'

It seems that these coalitions of experts are an outgrowth of
scientific communities. Progress of science requires the exchange of
information about new discoveries, techniques and theories between the
leading scientists. Their continued interaction forms a network of informal
links: acquaintances, friendships, partnerships and confidence, among
them, their collaborators and students, which favors the scientific research.
Furthermore, as both the scientific community itself and the complexity
and cost of the data collection increase, such community has to coordinate
its activities and concentrate its resources both through international non
governmental and intergovernmental organizations.62 Thus, if the members
of the scientific community develop policy objectives, or if their
knowledge is relevant to the political decision making process, the
scientific community's network of communication and convergence of
ideas facilitates the creation of transnational coalitions able to influence the
decision making process.
These coalitions based on scientific or technical knowledge whose
members promote coordinately a determined policy goal based arguably,
on their particular knowledge, have been denominated Epistemic
Communities.!, They have been defined as: "A group of individuals
(whose membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes
both scientists or experts and policy-makers) who share a common view
regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and who have a
common set of values [that] emerges in conjunction with the issue in
question." 64

61. Id. at 110.
62. See Crane, supra note 54, at 237-38, 250.
63. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179; Haas, Introduction, supra
note 7, passim.
64. Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko, Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings
from a Large Collaborative Research Project, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 250. Cf.
Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 179-80. Giving a more detailed and restrictive
definition;
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING THE 'BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS' MODEL

A. The Decision Making Process
The bureaucratic politics model of the state and the decision
making process seems adequate to explain the operation of international
law. Consider the simplest act relevant to international law, a unilateral
declaration. According to the 'bureaucratic politics' model, these kind of
acts should be either the result of the more or less detailed bargaining
process inside the governmental structure of only one state, or the sum of
relatively independent decisions and actions attributable to only one state.6
P. Kamath's account of the decision making process of India's unilateral
recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet provides a suitable example:
[a]ccording to the former Principal Private Secretary of
Nehru, M.O. Mathai, it was Ambassador K.M. Panikkar
who by a change of crucial word in the cable changed
India's policy on Tibet. Nehru's telegram to Panikkar in
Peking authorized him to communicate India's recognition
of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which Ambassador is
alleg[ing] to have changed to sovereignty. If this is true,
then Nehru did not make India's policy towards Tibet in
1950 but Ambassador Panikkar in fact made it. It is also
said that Nehru was persuaded by Pannikar not to insist on
a simultaneous Chinese recognition of McMahon line when
India recognized Chinese claim over Tibet."

They are a group of professionals, often from a number of different disciplines, who
share the following set of characteristics:
1. Shared consumatory values or principled beliefs. Such beliefs provide a value-based
rationale for social action of the members of the community.
2. Shared causal beliefs or professional judgments. Such beliefs provide analytic
reasons and explanations of behavior, offering causal explanations for the multiple
linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes.
3. Common notions of validity: intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
validating knowledge.
4. A common policy enterprise: a set of practices associated with a central set of
problems which have to be tackled, presumably out of a conviction that human welfare
will be enhanced as a consequence. Id.
65. See ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162-64.
66. P. M. KAMATH, FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND INTERNATIONAL POLmCS 90 (1990).
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India's decision to recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet without
insisting on a reciprocal recognition, seems, in Kamath's account, the
result of interaction of the central actors in India's foreign policy making:
the Prime Minister and his ambassador to Peking. India's recognition of
China's sovereignty over Tibet, seems to have been a decision of the
ambassador alone, who used his position, a bargaining advantage, to
change the key wording, thus overruling the Prime Minister's objections.
Hence, India's action, and its foreign policy and legal stand on this issue,
can accurately be described as a the sum of the inputs of several actors that
were able to act, interact, and prevail in the decision making process at its
different levels.
Usually, the decision making process of actions relevant to
international law is more complex than in Kamath's example. First, the
decision making process can be less centralized or the governmental
structure more complex. Second, nature of outcome being decided might
be, in itself, more complex than a unilateral declaration. It might involve
lengthy processes of negotiation with other states and the balancing of
contending interests in the municipal arena. In the case of multilateral
negotiations, these features of the bureaucratic decision making process
become acute, as illustrated by the United States' position during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
[a]t the Caracas law of the sea meetings, the United States
delegation numbered 110 (of which only 20 were from the
State Department) - a virtual conference within a
conference. The efforts of the secretary of state to cut the
size of the delegation still left a delegation over eighty at
Geneva in 1975 . .
Some U.S. delegates have
misrepresented views of foreign governments within the
delegation, others have taken position with foreign
delegates contrary to official policy. Unauthorized leaks of
U.S. fallback positions have not been uncommon.
Somewhat more subtlety, the various "clubs" of delegates
with similar functional interests in fishing, navies, oil,
mining, and so forth that were established as part of the
informal conference diplomacy set up regular channels of
communication that cut across and created tension within
61
the already fragmented national positions ....
A particularly important instance was the lobbying by the United
States Interior Department and oil company officials with less developed
67. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 116.
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countries in favor of broad coastal state jurisdiction over the continental
shelf (contrary to then official United States policy) at the Geneva sessions
8
of the Seabed Committee.6
These examples illustrate how the 'bureaucratic politics' model
serves to describe the decision making process of actions relevant to
international law. However, this description of the decision making
process of actions relevant to international law does not explain why
international law is complied in international relations.

B. The Effectiveness of InternationalLaw
I contend that the effectiveness of international law depends on
whether it affects the states' decision making processes in such a way that
the final outcomes comply or are in accordance with its substantive
provisions or not. Only if the outcomes of those processes comply with
international law, will it be effective.
Only if those outcomes are
construed to create or modify international law, will it be created or
modified. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how international law
affects the decision-maker's judgments in such a way that they will
produce outcomes in accordance with it.
International law can affect the judgments of the actors in the
decision making process in four different ways. First, it might be an
element in the formation of the individual actor's goals and interests.
Second, it might be part of the subject matter being decided. Third, it
might be a bargaining advantage in the hands of some of the actors; and,
fourth, it can be part of the constraints that might exist upon the bargaining
process.
First, international law might be an element in the formation of the
actors' goals. These goals are determined by the actors' positions in the
governmental structure, their personal values, interests, expectations and
conception of their role. Thus, it is possible that some actors may have
certain personal preference, inclination or commitment to international
law." If it is so, they may prefer and promote policies and conduct that
comply, or are in accordance, with it. President Wilson, who promoted

68. Id. at 149.
69. See ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT INA STATELESS SOCIETY 192 (1994) ("Subjects may feel an obligation to comply
with the prescriptions embedded in a regime because they see it as the proper thing to do on
moral or ethical grounds (that is, for moral reason)... ").
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mechanisms based on international law for the maintenance of international
peace, 0 exemplifies this attitude.
This kind of commitment to international law might flow from the
education, previous experiences or ethics of the actors. However, it can
also flow from the pure calculation of the advantages of that policy,7'1 either
because it reduces future conflicts or because it creates norms of conduct
that will, in subsequent interactions, be favorable to their interests or
increase their bargaining advantages.
Thus, for instance, Foreign
Ministries' legal advisors will tend to advance policies in accordance to
international law both as a result of their commitment, due to their
education and position, to law, and as a form to increase their own
influence and promote their parochial interests in their governments'
overall bargaining process.
Second, international law can be the subject matter of the decision
making process. Frequently, due to previous decisions and commitments,
state's and international organization's bureaucrats have to develop policies
or conduct towards international law or have to frame their decisions in
terms of international law. The extended negotiations and contradictions
within various governments to determine their positions during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea exemplify this situation.
The actors, while elaborating their state's positions towards the
Conference, had to advocate their preferred policies or conduct on the
substantive issues in normative terms, because only in such terms could
they have been embodied in the expected outcome of the Conference; a
treaty.
Third, knowledge of international law can be a bargaining
advantage in the decision making process. When international law is the
subject matter or a relevant element in the decision making process, due to
the technicality or intricacy of the issues, the task of making the decision is
shared with or transferred to experts in international law. Hence, as
predicted by the model, the experts become influential in the bureaucratic
bargaining because of their knowledge.
Furthermore, even when international law is less central to the
issues at stake, the knowledge of international law allows the actors that
possess it bring, in favor of their positions, the authority of previous
conmmitments, nr or superior values, such as the respect for law. Thus, as
70. See KALEVI J. HOLSTI, PEACE AND WAR: ARMED CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 1648-1989, 181-89 (1991).

71. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 193.
72. Cf. VERZTBERGER, supra note 33, at 306 (referring to the use of historical arguments
in the foreign policy decision making process: "[wihen information about the environment is
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far as the use of such arguments allows them to influence the final outcome
of the decision making process in line to their policy goals, their
knowledge of international law becomes a base for their power. The use
of international human rights law as an argument during the decision

making process seems a suitable example.
Fourth, international law can be a constraint upon the decision
making process. 7 Structural elements of international law are seldom
reconsidered. They are, in fact, the result of previous decisions, which
have settled the particular issues. Hence, all or most actors in the
subsequent decision making processes assume them. For instance, when
the policy toward a particular treaty negotiation is considered, the principle
of the sovereign equality of states, finally agreed during the 1645-1648
negotiation of the peace of Westphalia,"4 is usually assumed and, therefore,
the decisions are made taking it into consideration.
Similarly, international law can establish patterns of bargaining and
influence the relative power of the actors." In these cases, international
law determines the rules of the game of the decision making process. For
complex and poses a high level of uncertainty and where power is shared, argumentation by
reference to history is a vital component of policy formulation and serves as a means of
persuading both the self and others.").
73. See generally id. at 41-44 (discussing the psychological constraints that limit the
behavior of the foreign policy decision-makers).
The perception of constraints affects choice. In choosing among options, decisionmakers may systematically analyze the content of the issues at hand and the constraints
imposed by the environment on choice, the implementation of the chosen alternative,
and the possible consequences of any relevant option . . . tacit and explicit selfimposed commitments to other political entities and their determination of actors'
behavior towards their patterns. Thus, a partnership in an alliance imposes certain
types of behavior toward other partners and a different sort toward those outside the
alliance. Membership in an organization such as the United Nations demands, at least
nominally, the adoption of specific standards of behavior, and any deviation from them
is supposed to require explanation or self-justification. Id.
74. See HOLSTI, supra note 70, at 33-39.
75. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: Customary International
Law from an InterdisciplinaryPerspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 122-124 (1995) (arguing a
similar point using the state as a unitary actor model).
A legal system such as the international legal system does more than simply create
expectations and promote stability. It also fulfills an essential social function by
transforming applications of raw power into legitimate power, thereby creating rights
to apply power within certain structures using certain means. For instance, in the
absence of an overarching, law-making sovereign, the international legal system
demands reciprocity: recognition on the part of those applying power of the rights of
others to apply power within those same structures and using those same means. This
recognition in turn imposes a significant constraints on states as they engage in
behavior that contributes to the maintenance, development or change of rules of
customary international law. Id.
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example, the United Nations Charter and the rules of procedure of the
Council inform the bargaining process, which creates resolutions of the
Security Council of the United Nations. Thus, as far as the adoption of the
resolutions requires certain majority and the norms favor decisions by
consensus, the delegates that take part in the negotiations try actively to
obtain the acquiescence of even the smallest powers. In the same way, the
influence of the delegates of the permanent members is increased by the
shadow of their veto power, also granted by previous decision regarding
international law.
I submit that international law can affect, in any of the above
mentioned ways, the judgment of some actors in the decision making
process. If it does, such actors will be committed, constrained,
empowered or expert in international law. Hence, if any of those actors
prevails or influences the bargaining process, international law will
probably inform the final outcome, i.e., it will be effective. Conversely, if
those actors are excluded from the decision making process, or if they
exercise a minor influence, the final outcome will tend to be in less
conformity with international law. The degree of influence of those actors
upon the final outcome depends, as mentioned before, on their possession
of bargaining advantages, their skill and will to use those advantages, and
the other actor's perception of their possession and willingness to use those
advantages, over the several stages of the decision making process. In
consequence, the effectiveness of international law resides in the success of
those actors committed, constrained, empowered or expert in it, in
promoting policies or conducts in accordance with it, within the decision
making processes of their organizations.
Consider, for instance, the effectiveness of the Laws of War.
According to the previous argument, these norms would be effective only
if they affect the judgments of some decision makers in the chain of
command in such way that the final actions are in accordance with them.
Conversely, these norms would be ineffective if they are put aside during
the relevant decision making processes. General Powell's comment on the
1991 Gulf War decision making process seems to confirm these
propositions: "Decisions were impacted by legal considerations at every
level. Lawyers proved invaluable in the decision-making process." 76
C. The creation of InternationalLaw
The bureaucraticpolitics model also seems able to explain how
and why international law is created. It argues the actors in the decision
76. Christopher Greenwood, Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 4 STRATEGIC
AND COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER 1 (1993).
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making process try to promote their goals not only within their particular
organizations, but also through them. Governmental bureaucrats do not
limit their interests, goals and expectations to the municipal arena, but they
also have interests and goals in other states and expectations regarding the
whole international society. Hence, these actors pursue, within their
governments, outcomes regarding other states, i.e., foreign policy.
Furthermore, if these actors are, in some way, committed, constrained,
empowered or expert in international law, those outcomes will tend to be
expressed in terms of international law. Thus, I submit, international law
is created for promoting, in the international arena, the interests, goals and
values of those individuals committed, constrained or empowered by
international law or expert in it.
Once these individuals are successful in committing their
governments to diplomatic negotiations or in creating intergovernmental
organizations, the bureaucratic decision making process is extended to the
international arena. It seems that, in principle, international law affects the
judgments of the individual actors in the intergovernmental decision
making process in the same way that it does to those actors within the
internal decision making process. Therefore, international law can also be
an element in the formation of the individual actor's goals and interests, a
part of the subject matter being decided, a bargaining advantage in the
hands of some of the actors, or constitute constraints upon the bargaining
process. In consequence, it seems that international law results from the
"compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence," " all of which try to promote their parochial interests,
values and goals in the international arena.
The history of negotiation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provides some support to these theses. As Best remarks, the influence and
positions of some states seem to have been based on the influence and
interests of their delegates:
Britain's social strategist Alexander was not being entirely
satirical in his reference to 'the Great Powers (including
Monaco.)' Monaco's chief delegate was the vigorous and
influential French law professor from Aix-en-Provance,
Paul de Geouffre de La Pradelle. Monaco mattered partly
because he mattered. He was one of the most thoughtful
contributors to the debates (two years later published a
uniquely valuable book about the 1949 conference) and he
was a weighty spokesman for the most persistent of
77.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 162.
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pressure-groups, the International Committee of Military
Medicine and Pharmacy, from which, based in Monaco
before the war, had flowed a stream of humanitarian
proposals."7

In some instances, even the specific drafting of the provisions can
be related to the parochial and immediate interests of the actors. The
inconsistency embodied in article 130 of the III Geneva Convention, which
refers to great suffering or serious injury to body or health committed
againstpersons or property, 79 resulted, according to the British Foreign
Office, - to the fact that Mr. Vaillancourt, the head of the Canadian
delegation, wanting his lunch, did not allow the drafting committee to look
at it properly.80
Furthermore, as far as the actions within one government or
organization, or their outcomes, can affect the distribution of power or the
goals of actors in other governments, those actors with common goals or
values will tend to create transnational coalitions in order to increase their
overall influence.!' If the member of these coalitions are successful in
influencing their respective government's policy or conduct decision
making process, the outcomes, i.e., the actions attributed to those states,
will tend to converge.8 2 These facts explain both the successful conclusion
of treaties and the homogeneity of the state practice on which customary
international law is based.
Regarding the role of transnational coalitions in the successful
conclusion of treaties, a suitable example, which deserves to be quoted in
full, is provided by the description of the negotiating process of the
Atlantic Treaty given by Theodore Achiles, a member of the United States
delegation:
At first there were the British, French, Belgians, Dutch,
Luxembourgers, Canadians, and ourselves.
The
negotiations were normally conducted by the Secretary of
State and the various ambassadors in Washington. They
met only infrequently.
The actual negotiations were
78.

GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994).

79. III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, art. 130, 75 U.N.T.S., 39 U.K.T.S. Cmnd. 550, 47 A.S.I.L. Supl. 119-177 (1953).
80. BEST, supra note 78, at 165.
81.

ALLISON, supra note 3, at 178.

82. Cf. Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 188-89 ("[a]s epistemic
communities obtain and consolidate influence in different governments, national preferences and
policies will come to reflect the epistemic beliefs."); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R.
BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 37-38 (1982).
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conducted by a working group of which Jack Hickerson
was the senior member, Bill Galloway the junior officer,
and [which included] myself and two other members of the
U.S. team. The other members were ministers or political
counselors of the various embassies here.
That was before the days of air conditioning, and we met
all summer in our shirtsleeves around a table in one of the
offices of the State Department. By the time the summer
was over we had a treaty in pretty good shape, and all
knew each other intimately, trusted each other, and we
were all used to working together. Derick Hoyer-Miller,
who was the British minister and the senior member of the
British representatives in the working group, stated
something which we later called the NATO spirit. One
day in a working group he made a proposal. No one
remembers what it was, but nobody liked the proposal and
we all said so rather bluntly. And Derick said, all right,
those are my instructions from London. I'll tell them that I
made my pitch and that it was shot down, and that this is
what everybody else thinks that the answer should be.
So we worked out collectively what we thought the best
arrangement was. Derick referred it back to London and
got approval on it, and we all referred it to our various
governments and got approval.
That developed into a quite a negotiation technique. No
matter what any of us had by the way of instruction, we
would try to find what we thought was the right answer,
and then tried to get our respective governments to agree
to it. That worked out very well indeed. 83
Regarding customary international law, I contend its coherence is
due to the fact that individuals belonging to the same epistemic community
create it. As far as those individuals sharing knowledge about international
law are committed, in different degrees, to promote outcomes in its terms
and are successful in doing so both within the bureaucratic decision making
process of their states or organizations and while acting in the international
arena on their behalf, the actions regarding international law attributed to

83.

ZARTMAN, supra note 82, at 37-38.
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their states or organizations do converge.8 The sum of these converging
actions constitutes general practice.
It seems that international lawyers and diplomats form the
epistemic community which creates international law. They share, on
broad terms, certain number of professional beliefs: a similar conception of
international law, its principles, sources and procedures. 8 The existence of
these shared beliefs is evidenced by the fact that most introductory manuals
to international law argue the same points, with the same examples, and,
usually, even following the same structure. Similar syllabi and teaching
methodologies in international law lectures around the world reinforce the
homogeneity of the shared knowledge," while the leading scholars
systematize it and help to propagate it. Thus, if these beliefs are generally
effective in international relations, is because those professionals are able
to advance them through their state's or organization's policy-making
processes.
These individuals also form a transnational network of
professionals, as it is proved by the extended membership of professional
organizations such as the American Society of International Law'7 and the
existence of activities such as the annual meeting of Foreign Ministries'

84. Cf. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 210-11
(1994) (arguing the investment protection law has been created by a 'club of jurists': "[olverseas
tribunals are inclined to apply norms developed by jurists from capital-exporting states which are
favorable to investment protection... Statements that arbitrators belong to a club that reinforces
attitudes of its members are beginning to appear.").
85. See Jutta Brunn& & Stephen 1. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 34 (1997) ("It might even be
argued that international lawyers themselves form something akin to an epistemic community,
because they promote values through specific principles, such as the ecosystem principles posited
in this paper, which can guide the evolution of regimes and ultimately gain normative
significance."); see also Byers, supra note 75, at 130 ("As a social institution the process of
customary law is above all a set of shared beliefs, expectations or understandings held by the
individual human beings who govern and represent states. Like all institutions, and the
international system itself, it is a set of ideas.").

86. See generally JOHN

KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S

(1992).
87. Charlotte Ku, Message from the Executive Director, ASIL NEWSLETrER (The Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar.-May 1996, at 4.

Through membership in the American Society of International Law, individuals gain
access to a specialized and well-recognized network - both of other ASIL members and
of members of organizations comparable to the society ....
It is the formation and
maintenance of this network which are a principal task of the leadership and staff of
the organization. The network further identifies opportunities to motivate and to
mobilize members to take leadership roles in their communities and professional life to
foster the use and study of international law.
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legal advisors during the General Assembly of the United Nations." Their
regular contact both through intergovernmental meetings and private
associations provides them with an opportunity to form acquaintances,
share information and create common values, all of which facilitate the
formation of coalitions for the promotion of specific policy objectives.
It seems also that they share, on very broad basis, the same values
and policy objectives. Most international lawyers and diplomats seem to
be committed to promoting the rule of law in international relations:
"world order through law. "1 Nevertheless, some empirical research seems
necessary to assess the extent of this commitment and whether it is
transformed into specific policy recommendations.
On the other hand, subgroups of this network clearly have shared
values and policy objectives. For instance, a coalition including legal
experts of the International Red Cross; Professor H. Lauterpacht, from
Cambridge; Professor Graven, from Geneva University; Max Huber,
former judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice; Captain
Mouton, a member of The Netherlands's Supreme Court; and Coronel
Phillimore, a legal advisor to the British Government and a member of the
prosecution in Nuremberg, developed and successfully promoted the
concept of grave breaches during the 1949 Geneva Conference.90 Another
example is provided by the coalition of Foreign Ministries' legal advisors,
legal counselors in several permanent missions to the United Nations and
the World Health Organizations, and private international lawyers
belonging to several NGOs, that was able to advance two requests for
advisory opinions on the use of nuclear weapons to the International Court
of Justice. 9 Finally, M. Sonarajah contends that a similar coalition is
acting in the area of protection of foreign investment.n
88. Miguel Angel Gonzllez Felix, Fifth Legal Advisers' Meeting at UN Headquaters in
New York, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 644, 644-49 (1995).
89. Cf. Reisman, supra note 43, at 123 (arguing that:
Jurists are distinctive among them [scholars] in that they alone undertake, explicitly, to
intervene in the social process that has been examined in order to secure changes in the
pattern of authoritative decision so that it will henceforth discriminate in favor of a
particular party or, one hopes, in favor of the common interest).
90. BEST, supra note 78, at 160-65.
91. Manfred Mohr, Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice on the Legality
of the use of Nuclear Weapons Under InternationalLaw, a Few Thoughts on its Strengths and
Weaknesses, 316 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 92, 92-93 (1997).
In May 1992 an international campaign was launched in Geneva by non/governmental
organizations (NGOs) under the title World Court Project. The original promoters of
the campaign were the long-standing International Peace Bureau (IPB) in Geneva, the
well-known International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, formed at the end of the
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V.

CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

If the previous argument, that international law is a set of norms

created by the members of an epistemic community, for promoting their
parochial interests, goals and values in the international arena, were to be
accepted; it would be necessary to reconsider the nature of international
law. Conceiving it just as a system of law based on the will and practices
of the states would appear unsatisfactory.
Therefore, I suggest that
international law should be conceived as an international regime created by

an epistemic community.
The concept of international regimes, as used by political scientists
and international relations scholars, refers to "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." 91
This concept, in principle, does not coincide with that of international
law." It does not require the norms to be legally binding or have a legal
1980s. Some 10 more (international) NGOs, including Greenpeace International, later
joined in. What at the outset looked like rather unpromising initiative by a few
determined "peace activists" soon developed into a worldwide movement made up of
numerous non-governmental and governmental players.
See also Legality of the Threat or use of nuclear weapon Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Oda, I.C.J. § 8 (1996), UN Doc. A/51/218 pp. 94-95 (1996), 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343
(1996) (explaining the previous involvement of the NGO's).
.92. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 84, at 354-55.
There are no objective criteria by which the principles of this so-called legal system
[lex mercatoria]canbe identified and no bench-mark by which it could be tested except
its acceptance by a select group of European arbitrators and scholars who promote it
through their incestuous writings. Systematic damage is done by efforts to create
investment protection through the formulation of spurious doctrines by scholars totally
committed to the protection of the multinational corporations and hostile to the
interests of the developing countries. It is unlikely that these efforts will cease.
93. Krasner, supra note 8, at 2; see MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A. SuTrON,
GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKS:

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR TRANSPORTATION

AND

COMMUNICATIONS 14-15 (1996); cf. Volker Rittberger, Research on International Regimes in
Germany: The Adaptative Internalization of an American Social Science Concept, in REGIME
THEORY, supra note 5, at 10 - 11.
94. Cf. Brunn6e, supra note 85, at 31 (using a more restrictive definition of regimes than
the one used in this paper: "Regimes as understood in international relations theory, because of
their grounding in state practice, provide building blocks for the construction of more specific
(and binding) legal regimes. We call these relatively informal and nonbinding regimes contextual
regimes for they provide a setting in which binding normativity can emerge."); but see Byers,
supra note 75, at 128-36 ("To an international lawyer this phenomenon [regimes] sounds like
international law by another name, Indeed, it is international law, with the important twist that
the regime theorists, unlike international lawyers, are directly concerned about the relationship
between power and sets of rules or procedures."); YOUNG, supra note 69, at 184-211; Kenneth
W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint Discipline, 86 A.S.I.L. PROC. 167-72 (1992); Burley, supra note
2, at 220; Oran R. Young, Remarks, 86 A.S.I.L PROC. 172-75 (1992).
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character. 5 On the contrary, it purports to include norms, rules, principles
and decision making procedure that do not necessarily belong to
international law, such as non binding guidelines, secret or illegal
agreements and even implicit agreements for the division of areas of
influence." Furthermore, regimes theory considers separate sections of
international law, or sets of norms, as separate international regimes.
Thus, for example, the internationalshipping regime, formed by over fifty
international instruments regulating damage and compensation," and the
Jan Mayen-Iceland Marine Resources regime," based on a treaty between
Iceland and Norway," are considered totally independent regimes.
Nevertheless, this kind of approach is familiar to international law
scholarship. It is usual to describe areas of the law as separate unties: Law
of the Sea, Laws of War, International Human Rights Law, the Hague
System for the Settlement of Disputes, the Regime of the High Seas,
Diplomatic Protection.'" ° In addition, as far as general international law
constitutes an indispensable framework for each particular international
regime 01 and provides some of their defining characteristics,- it constitutes
95. Robert 0. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a EuropeanAmerican Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at 27-28 (arguing that a
defining characteristic of regimes is their effectiveness).
Mhe most fundamental issue is whether regimes are to be identified on the basis of
explicit rules and procedures, or on the basis of observed behavior, from which rules,
norms, principles, and procedures can be inferred. Defining regimes simply in terms
of explicit rules and procedures risks slipping into the formalism characteristic of some
traditions of international law: that is, purely nominal agreements could be considered
to be regimes, even though they had no behavioral implications. The futile and empty
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1927, to outlaw war, could on a formalistic definition be
considered an international regime.
Rittberger, supra note 93, at 11.
96. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 200-02; Friedrich Kratochiwil, Contract and Regimes:
Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter?, in REGIME THEORY, supra note 5, at
73, 85-91.
97. See ZACHER, supra note 93, at 52-54.
98. See YOUNG, supra note 69, at 61-63.
99. Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct. 22, 1981,
Iceland-Norway, 21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
100. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 528 (arguing that:
International Law is not a system replete with certain nominated torts or delicts, but
[that] the rules are specialized in certain respects. Thus reference may be made to the
source of harm, such as unauthorized acts of officials, insurrections, and so on, or to
the object and form of harm, as, for example, territorial sovereignty, diplomats and
other official agents, or injury to nationals).
101. See ZACHER, supra note 93, at 2.
Without states' acceptance of each other's sovereign authority with defined territorial
domains, their network of diplomatic conventions for communication and international
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an integral element of each of them. Hence, as far as general international
law is a set of norms shared among several independent regimes, it can be
described as a meta regime.0 3
Thus, I submit, particular sets of international law norms constitute
several specific international regimes, characterized by the actor's
perception that their norms are legally binding (opinio juris), while the
core of general international law; including, possibly, its general
principles, definitions about its subjects and sources, and basic principles
on law of treaties and settlement of international disputes; constitutes a
meta regime.
Once international law is conceptualized as an international regime
created by an epistemic community, it is possible to apply to it, in order to
understand its development, the theoretical elaboration of regimes theory.
This theory contends that, when the distribution of power in the
international society favors a state or group of states, norms are created by
the action of actors and epistemic communities through the machinery of
that hegemonic power, and that those norms will persists as long as that
state maintains its dominant position.'- When the power is distributed
homogeneously or in several centers, the norms, according to this theory,
are created by the action of the members of epistemic communities in the
different governments, and they persists as far as those actors retain their

law-making, and their obligations to comply with international agreements and to
assure compliance by their citizens, it would be impossible to generate the kinds of
specific regimes that are increasingly prevalent and important in many spheres of
international relations.
102. Cf. Kratochiwil, supra note 96, at 80-1.
Although many regimes are likely to contain rules and norms that serve this function
[increasing transparency and lowering transaction costs], it is difficult to call such
provisions by themselves a regime, unless we refer directly to contracting itself as a
regime. At a minimum, a regime requires a relationship that emerges from a long-term
interactive contracting. This seems to be required for two reasons. First, the parties to
an incomplete contract must agree not only on rules regulating specific actions, but
also on much more general principles which impose upon them duties to settle future
disputes. Consequently, it is quite understandable that these principles have been held
to supply the 'basic defining characteristics of a regime', or even its 'nature'. Id.
103. See generally ZACHER, supra note 93, at 14 ("Norms are also often shared among
specific regimes, and when the norms are the same or very similar among a number of regimes,
it is possible to say that a meta regime exists.").
104. See Haas, Epistemic Communities, supra note 7, at 187 ("Under conditions of
uncertainty, when the international power is concentrated in one state, and when epistemic
communities have successfully consolidated influence in the dominant state . . . [tihe regime
would still be created through the intercession of the hegemon, but its substance would reflect
epistemic consensus.").
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When there is a change in the distribution of power, the

norms may persist if some members of the epistemic community that
created them are able to acquire bureaucratic positions in the new dominant
powers. Nevertheless, if the knowledge of such community looses its
validity, the regime will decay. This theory further argues that both the
variations in the national policies and the different degrees of compliance
with the norms are due to the different degrees of penetration and influence

of the members of the epistemic community in the decision making
processes of each state. '06
This approach can provide some insights on the development of
international law. First, it can explain its main trends. Thus, for example,
the acceptance of international law by Third World Countries and NonWestern States '°1 can be explained as the result of the penetration of
members of the epistemic community of international law practitioners into
the growing bureaucracies of those states.' 08 Second, it can explain
particular incidents in the development of the law. For instance, it would
attribute the negotiations on the Law of the Sea since 1967, including the
entrance into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, and the negotiation of two implementation agreements, I0° to the
105. See id. at 188-89.
106. See id. at 189.
National positions would vary according to the extent of penetration by epistemic
communities, or the sensitivity of policies in that country to policies in a country
already influenced by the epistemic community. . . . Policies and linkages may be
quite sophisticated, reflecting the quality of its beliefs. The extent to which such
lessons are accepted and converted into new policies in different countries, as well as
regime compliance, are subject to the ability of members of the epistemic community
to occupy key bureaucratic slots and to persuade others of their preferred policies.
107. See generally CASSESE, supra note 17, at 69-70.
108, Cf. ZARTMAN, supra note 82, at 226.
By now the world has established an international diplomatic culture that soon
socializes its members into a similar behavior. Even the Chinese have learned to play
the U.N. game by its rules, newly independent countries such as the African nations
attach themselves to their former colonial delegations for general advice until they
have learned the ropes, and groups of delegates teach the newer members about
diplomatic ways originally developed for a European state system. It is difficult to
maintain, as Nicolson and Morgenthau did, that the Western system of diplomacy and
negotiation worked out over the centuries is in danger of imminent destruction at the
hands of people who cannot comprehend our ways; to the contrary, the new nations
have learned the Western ways well and are using them to their own purposes.
109. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, UN
Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted July 28, 1994,

1161

1998]

activities of a epistemic community of international lawyers and
practitioners,10 formed around Ambassador Pardo,"' and which grew
during the following negotiations.
On the other hand, while this approach can provide a deeper
understanding of the nature of international law and its role in international
relations, it does not challenge the normal practice of international law. Its
conclusions are limited to the theory of international law, not to the normal
science12 of international law. International law's methods do not lose
their validity because they are the methods reserved for a community that
uses them to promote the values and goals of its members. On the
contrary, they are valid precisely because the members of such a
community accept them, and the conclusions reached using them, as valid.
Hence, international lawyers would have to continue arguing international
law, using legal terms and legal methods, in order for their conclusions to
be accepted as relevant statements of the law by other members of their
community and, as a consequence, to be influential in promoting their own
goals and values.
Finally, this conception of international law does have an ethical
consequence. It highlights the role that international lawyers, including
diplomats, legal advisors and academicians, play in international relations.
It reveals that these individuals have certain values and goals regarding
how international relations should be, and that they work to assure that
those values are embodied in the actual practice attributed to their states or
international organizations. Thus, it would require these professionals to
acknowledge their role and relevance and to be aware of the direction that
they are imprinting upon the international society. This new awareness
calls for higher level of responsibility on their part.
Politicians and diplomats were privileged inhabitants of a
world of unreality, an unreality which was life-threatening
on a grand scale, a world which nevertheless seemed to its
G.A. Res. 48/263 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994); Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, adopted Dec. 5, 1995, G.A. Res. 50/24 (1995), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37; U.N.
Doc. A/50/550, annex I.

110. Cf. KEOHANE, supra note 6, at 114-16, 125, 148 - 50.
111. Cf. CASSESE, supra note 17, at 379-84.
112. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed. 1970)

(defining a normal science as the scientific endeavor which uses a paradigm, i.e., (at vii) the
'universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and
solutions to a community of practitioners," as its criteria for determining the validity any further
research.).
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inhabitants, in characteristic paranoid fashion, to be
perfectly real and natural and inevitably and right. It
followed that specialists in the study of so-called
international relations were studying a form of pathological
behavior.
And it followed also that the role of
international lawyers had been to seek to rationalize and
3
regularize pathological behavior."

113. ALLOTr, supra note 1, at xii.

